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I. JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this court pursuant to 
§78-2a-3(2)(d), Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1989), whereby a defendant 
in a criminal case may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals 
from a final judgment in a Circuit Court. 
II. NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This case represents an appeal from defendant's 
sentencing on January 23, 1990, after pleading guilty to the 
charge of possession of a controlled substance inside a 
correctional facility, a class B misdemeanor, in the Third 
Circuit Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Salt 
Lake City Department, the Honorable Paul G. Grant presiding. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The threshold question is whether Judge Grant's 
sentencing of appellant for a class "A" misdemeanor on the 16th 
of November, 1989, was a valid sentencing, and if so, did Judge 
Grant order this sentence to run consecutively with the prison 
sentence appellant was already serving? 
The state concurs with appellant that he is entitled to 
credit for time served from November 16, 1989, to January 23, 
1990. 
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS CONSIDERED 
DETERMINATIVE 
None 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 16, 1989, defendant/appellaint plead guilty 
to a class A misdemeanor. It was subsequently determined by 
appellant's counsel, and stipulated to by the plaintiff/appellee 
that the class A charge was incorrect and not supported by the 
facts of the case. It is disputed as to whether appellant was 
given concurrent or consecutive sentence. 
Upon appellant's motion for resentencing, the class A 
misdemeanor was amended to the proper charge, a class B 
misdemeanor, and upon this corrected charge defendant was 
sentenced and given six months jail to run consecutively with 
defendant's prior prison commitment. 
VI. STATEMENT OF PACTS 
Appellee is satisfied with appellant's statement of the 
facts, with the following exception: (1) Appellant states that 
regarding the November 16, 1989, sentencing "Judge Grant did not 
order that the term of sentence run consecutively with the 
sentence Mr. Fisher is already serving." Appellant's brief page 
1. 
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VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant's sentencing for a class A misdemeanor on 
November 16, 1989, was invalid and of no effect because it was 
based on facts which did not give rise to a class A misdemeanor. 
Because it was invalid it cannot now be used by Appellant to show 
that a subsequent sentencing was more severe in effect. 
In the alternative, Appellee further contends that 
Judge Grant's sentencing of November 16, 1989, for a one year 
commitment, was to run consecutive to Appellant's existing prison 
sentence and therefore, a subsequent sentence for a six month 
commitment on a class B misdemeanor would result in a lesser 
penalty, and not a "more severe" penalty as Appellant argues. 
VIII. ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
JUDGE GRANT'S SENTENCING OF NOVEMBER 16, 1989, WAS NULL 
AND VOID AND THEREFORE CANNOT BE USED BY APPELLANT TO 
SHOW THAT A SUBSEQUENT SENTENCING WAS "MORE SEVERE". 
Judge Grant's sentencing on November 16, 1989, was 
after appellant had pled guilty to a class A misdemeanor. As 
Appellant counsel states, "Some time after November 16, 1989, 
defense counsel realized that Mr. Fisher had been incorrectly 
charged with a class A misdemeanor, and that based on the facts 
of this case he should have been charged with a class B 
misdemeanor . . . " Appellant's brief page 2. 
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The State agreed, and stipulated to Mr. Fisher 
withdrawing his plea and entering a guilty plea to the correct 
charge, a class B misdemeanor. 
Appellant now argues that the sentence was "more 
severe" than the November 16, 1989, sentence. However, as all 
parties have agreed, the November 16, 1989, sentencing was not 
based upon a proper charge, and therefore, the sentence was 
improper. 
In State v. Lee Lin, 7 P. 2d 825 (1932), the Utah 
Supreme Court discussed the effect of invalid judgments and 
sentences. The issue before the court was whether the District 
Court had jurisdiction after an invalid sentence had been 
imposed. The court stated: 
"Here the conviction was valid, but the sentence 
was void. The void sentence created no rights, 
nor did it impair or affect any right. The case 
stood as if no sentence had been imposed, and 
jurisdiction of the district court continued 
until a valid judgment was imposed. . ." State v. 
Lee Lin, 7 P.2d 825, 827. Emphasis added. 
The Court futher commented regarding the defendant's 
argument that an invalid sentence should release him from further 
prosecution by stating: 
"A void judgment (sentence) does not operate to 
divest a court of jurisdiction of the cause in 
which it is rendered. It is a mere nullity, 
and is ineffective for any purpose." State v. 
Lee Lin, supra at 827. Emphasis added. 
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In summary, Appellant's November 16, 1989, sentence is 
null and void and "ineffective for any purpose". Therefore, 
appellant's due process rights have not been violated. 
POINT II 
JUDGE GRANT'S ONE YEAR SENTENCING ON NOVEMBER 16, 1989, 
WAS TO RUN CONSECUTIVE, AND THEREFORE, THE SIX MONTH 
CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE ON JANUARY 23, 1990, WAS A 
"LESSER" SENTENCE, NOT "MORE SEVERE" AS 
APPELLANT ARGUES. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the November 16, 1989, 
sentencing is considered for due process analysis, the record 
reflects that Judge Grant did advise appellant that a consecutive 
one year sentence was ordered. 
The November 16, 1989, transcript (hereinafter "NT") 
shows Judge Grant specifically stated concurrent time would not be 
given: 
THE COURT: Okay, It'll be a year, you can also serve 
that time at the prison, if you want. That's what I'd 
suggest you do. I don't think you want to sit in jail 
on it, do you? 
MR. FISHER: Oh, no. 
MR. SCOWCROFT: Would your Honor allow him to serve 
that time concurrently with the sentence he's now 
serving at the prison? 
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THE COURT: "Well, as soon as I sentence him and he 
opts to go to prison, it's the Board of Pardons you 
need to talk about, not me. I never give concurrent 
time/ so I figure you commit them one at a time, you 
pay for them one at a time. . ." NT, pg.5, line 6-20. 
See Addendum A. 
Judge Grant correctly stated that once appellant 
elected to serve the year at the prison the Board of Pardons would 
then decide how much time appellant would actually serve. See 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-5(1)(a)(Supp. 1989). 
Because the November 16, 1989, sentence was a 
consecutive one year sentence for a class A misdemeanor, the 
January 23, 1990, consecutive six month sentence for a class B 
misdemeanor cannot be said to be "more severe". 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the argument and authorities presented, and 
upon the record, appellee seeks affirmance of the decision of the 
trial court, with the exception that appellant be given credit for 
time served from November 16, 1989, to January 23, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Utah Attorney General 
WILLIAM J. ALBRIGHT 
Special Asst. Atty. General 
By: 
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ADDENDUM A 
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THE COURT: Us guys didn't threaten anybody, 
MR. FISHER: Well, the way the lawyer ran it down to 
her, that's how it came out, is either she pled to a Class A 
or she was going to jail on a third-degree felony charge. 
And my— 
THE COURT: Okay. It'll be a year, you can also 
serve that time at the prison, if you want. That's what I'd 
suggest you do. I don't think you want to sit in jail on it, 
do you? 
MR. FISHER: Oh, no. 
11
 j MR. SCOWCROFT: Would your Honor allow him to serve 
that time concurrently with the sentence he's now serving at the 
prison? 
THE COURT: Well, as soon as I sentence him and he opts 
to go to the prison, it's the Board of Pardons you need to talk 
about, not me. I never give concurrent time, so I figure you 
12 
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* J commit them one at a time, you pay for them one at a time, so 
* • that's the reason I suggest, one, you don't want to go to jail, 
19 
20 
21 
22 
and two, if you want concurrent consideration, you want to get 
out to the Board and do your work, that's your best shot. 
MR. FISHER: So, it's up to the Board then? 
THE COURT: It's up to the Board, between you and the 
23
 J Board, how much time you serve is between you two. 
24 !
 MR. FISHER: So, they'll have to give me one Board 
1
 date and then take me back in front of the Board again? 
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